Saturday, January 24, 2015

On American Sniper and Policy


I haven’t seen American Sniper (AS) yet, but that is due not to lack of interest but of time. That said, I can’t help but notice the controversy the film has generated. Rather go down the path of identifying critics and calling them out, I thought it would be more productive and instructive instead to step back and think about what’s driving this stilted and heated “conversation” between the fans of AS and its critics.

Let me first reflect on the reasons why I named this blog, “on policy, etc.” Policy always concerns the policy problématique: how to interpret events in the past to inform decisions in the present to improve the future. It’s easy to describe, but nothing is harder due to the complexity of the social systems policies are intended to influence, like the Iraq War. The implementation of policy seldom goes according to plan, which results in policy resistance. Complex social systems exhibit behaviors that confound straightforward logic and tend to yield results that are surprising, unexpected, or counterintuitive. For example, US military forces entered Iraq in 2003 expecting to oust Saddam Hussein and set up a workable democracy. Deposing Saddam went mostly according to plan, but the insurgency disrupted the UW policymakers’ plans for an early exit and eventually resulted in the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL).

Chris Kyle spent four tours in the Iraq, and it is important to remember that he was sent there by American politicians to implement US foreign policy, and by all accounts he did his best to do just that. However, I maintain that US policy in Iraq was ill-conceived, which greatly increased the difficulty of Kyle’s mission. One of the great phrases in the military is that a mission plan or policy “briefs well.” In other words, it tells a good, simple, and convincing story, but left implicit is the small problem is that the plan probably won’t work. So people like Kyle then face the intractable difficulties of inflated expectations, simplistic solutions, and unrealistic timelines that inevitably become more limited possibilities, complex considerations, and extended timelines – that is, what results when people try to achieve something hard in the real world. What’s particularly tragic is when people are criticized for taking on these difficult tasks and coming up short despite their best efforts, especially when they are undertaken in the national interest.

AS is compelling because it highlights the emotional toll such extended efforts exact, but there’s another point to be made here: shouldn’t senior policy makers be held accountable for the decision they make, the policies they craft, and the unworkable situations into which they put people like Chris Kyle? If it’s the job of senior decision makers to craft policy, should they be punished for doing it badly? It’s a story as old of time, but such policies, like invading Iraq and setting up a democracy, are too often implemented without sufficient attention given to the complexities, details, and likely consequences of such actions. Policies are too often implemented based on a feel-good, overly optimistic narrative that “briefs well.” It seems that undertaking something as serious as war with its attendant costs in terms of time, treasure, and lives, merits more serious consideration and analysis than is currently the case. Certainly seeing the pain associated with Chris Kyle’s life—both in the US and Iraq—should provide us with the incentive to consider the way policy is crafted as well as holding senior government decision makers to standards of truth, courage, and excellence as high as those demonstrated by Chris Kyle.